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ABSTRACT
Soft errors are considered as a key reliability challenge for sub-nano scale transistors.
An ideal solution for such a challenge should ultimately eliminate the effect of soft
errors from the microprocessor. While forward recovery techniques achieve fast re-
covery from errors by simply voting out the wrong values, they incur the overhead of
three copies execution. Backward recovery techniques only need two copies of execu-
tion, but suffer from check-pointing overhead.
In this work I explored the efficiency of integrating check-pointing into the applica-
tion and the effectiveness of recovery that can be performed upon it. After evaluating
the available fine-grained approaches to perform recovery, I am introducing InCheck,
an in-application recovery scheme that can be integrated into instruction-duplication
based techniques, thus providing a fast error recovery. The proposed technique makes
light-weight checkpoints at the basic-block granularity, and uses them for recovery
purposes.
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed technique, 10,000 fault injection experi-
ments were performed on different hardware components of a modern ARM in-order
simulated processor. InCheck was able to recover from all detected errors by replay-
ing about 20 instructions, however, the state of the art recovery scheme failed more
than 200 times.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Due to massive technology scaling, we have reached a point where we are able to
make high performing processors that are affordable and power-efficient. Computing
systems started becoming so crucial that their failure might be jeopardizing human
safety. In applications ranging from smart cars to space shuttles, system dependabil-
ity plays a critical role in processor design decisions. Soft-Error resilience is one of
the key challenges to be addressed in making such processors reliable.
The term Linear Energy Transfer (LET) is generally used to describe the action of
the radiation upon a processor. It can be quantified as the energy transferred by an
ionizing particle while it traverses a unit distance through the processor. Soft-Errors
(SE) are said to happen due to LET from particles with enough energy to alter the
data stored in processor memory elements like registers, flip-flop, latches. The term
”soft” originates from the fact that these errors do not result in a permanent change
to processor circuitry. Sources of SEs’ include but are not just limited to Cosmic
rays, mechanical vibrations in moving parts, heat dissipation, radio-active elemental
traces etc. The rate at which they happen highly depends on altitude of location
under consideration.
Soft-Errors are a rare phenomenon. High energy cosmic flux hits the upper lay-
ers of earth’s atmosphere at a rate of 1000 particles/m2-s. As they progress to-
wards the earth’s surface, atmospheric collisions cause a cascade and raise the flux
to 1000000/m2-s at altitudes of around 40,000 ft. However due to the higher density
of lower atmosphere, most of this flux gets absorbed making it only 10 times higher
than the initially incident flux. (˜1/cm2-s) Ziegler et al. (1996). Not every particle
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strike from this flux will cause a soft-error induced system failure. Experiments done
on DRAM cells by Li et al. (2010), report a 0.061 FIT per Mbit. (Failure In Time:
Number of expected failures in 109 hours of operation).
Hardware soft error detection strategies, ranging from low-level circuit design tech-
niques to high-level redundancy-based techniques, have been employed in many ded-
icated mission-critical systems. However, in a new class of emerging application,
the so called mixed-critical systems, critical and noncritical programs share a com-
mon underlying microprocessor. In such systems, application-level FT techniques are
more effective because of their flexibility. Several independent radiation-based test-
ing and low-level soft error emulation studies have already shown the effectiveness of
application-level FT approaches.
Most of software-level fault tolerance techniques Didehban and Shrivastava (2016);
Feng et al. (2010); Khudia et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2007); Oh et al. (2002a); Zhang
et al. (2012a,b); Mitropoulou et al. (2014); Reis et al. (2005); Oh et al. (2002b) fo-
cus on error detection while assuming some kind of backward recovery is available.
Restarting a program from the beginning is the simplest method of backward recovery
Rennels and Hwang (2001). However, it suffers from a very high error recovery latency
and is not applicable in some cases, i.e, a long running-application which is execut-
ing in an environment with the soft error frequency more than the the applications
execution time . The most common method of recovery is checkpointing/rollback
strategy. In such techniques, the program execution is paused periodically and a
snapshot of the program state, called checkpoint, will get preserved in a safe storage.
If the error detection unit declares the manifestation of any error, the program exe-
cution gets terminated, and resumes (rollbacks) from the last checkpoint. However,
the usage of checkpoint-based recovery techniques is limited to High Performance
Computing applications. This is due to the significant (about 50% Elnozahy and
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Plank (2004); Schroeder and Gibson (2007)) performance and storage overhead of
frequent and multiple checkpoints which are required for successful recovery from
SDCs Aupy et al. (2013). Note that on top of the checkpointing cost, the error
detection overhead, which is in order of 2x for redundancy-based techniques has to
be considered for calculating the overall cost of backward recovery. I believe that
if the error handling phases, mainly detection and recovery, collaborate with each
other, more effective and efficient fault tolerance is achievable. In this work, I present
an in-application low-level recovery mechanism called InCheck (INtegrated CHECK-
pointing and Recovery). It combines with a fine-grain instruction duplication-based
detection strategy, to provide fast and effective error recovery. The key idea of Incheck
is to preserve the state of error-free register file in the beginning of each basic block,
and to back up every memory location before each update. If the error detector de-
clares the manifestation of any error, the program is redirected to the recovery block.
In recovery block, the state of memory and register file revert to the initial state that
they had in the beginning of BB and the program execution resumes from there. In
order to evaluate the effectiveness of Incheck, I performed about 10,000 system-wide
microarchitectural fault injection experiments on Mibench programs compiled with
-O3 optimization flag. The results prove that Incheck is extremely effective.
3
Chapter 2
MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORKS
Transient faults or soft errors are considered as one of the main reliability threats in
future systems. The effects of soft error will get masked by various masking effects
in most of the cases. However, in some situations soft errors will survive masking ef-
fects and lead to a failures such as SDC (Silent Data Corruption), segmentation fault,
system hang. In contrast to other failure modes, SDCs are considered to be the most
dangerous as there will be no user recognizable sign that the results are incorrect.
One way to provide complete fault tolerance is to adopt forward-recovery which is
made possible by nMR (n-Module Redundancy) execution and voting strategy. There
are no active error detection and recovery phases in forward-recovery strategy. They
eliminate the effect of error by performing majority-voting between redundantly com-
puted results. Software implementation of nMR can take place at multiple granular-
ities ranging from coarse-grained program or module triplication Shye et al. (2009,
2007); Quinn et al. (2015); Do¨bel and Ha¨rtig (2014) to fine-grain, low-level, assembly
instruction triplication Reis et al. (2007); Chang et al. (2006); Restrepo-Calle et al.
(2013). In coarse-grain software implemented TMR, three independent versions of a
program Quinn et al. (2015) or process Shye et al. (2009, 2007) with separate data and
memory get executed.The majority-voting takes place at the end of program either be-
tween the redundantly computed-results Quinn et al. (2015) or between arguments at
system calls’ boundaries Shye et al. (2009, 2007); Do¨bel and Ha¨rtig (2014). Fine-grain
forward-recovery techniques provide a more efficient way of dealing with soft errors by
eliminating the need for memory triplication and placing checking/voting operations
at strategic points of execution. For instance, SWIFT-R Reis et al. (2007); Chang
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et al. (2006) an assembly-level forward-recovery technique, assumes ECC-protected
memory and therefore excludes the memory subsystem from its sphere-of-protection.
SWIFT-R transformation divides programmer-visible registers into three sets, and
triplicates program’s computational instructions. To make sure that the error-free
values will transfer to/from the memory, SWIFT-R performs 2-of-3 majority-voting
between three types of redundantly-computed values:
1. Memory(read/write) instruction’s base address register
2. Memory write instruction’s value register
3. Compare instruction’s register operands
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Figure 2.1: nZDC Data-Flow Protection Scheme
Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SWIFT) Reis et al. (2005) is a double modu-
lar redundancy based technique that can provide soft-error detection. However it does
not duplicate memory and control flow instructions. Research done in nZDCDidehban
and Shrivastava (2016), shows that in SWIFT memory and control flow instructions
(about 30% of a SWIFT-protected program) are susceptible to soft errors as they
turn into single points of failure. SWIFT-R was an attempt to integrate the feature
of forward recovery into SWIFT. SWIFT-R adds one redundancy on top of SWIFT’s
double modular redundancy and accomplishes recovery by means of majority vot-
ing between these three redundancies. However, similar to SWIFT, it suffers from
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Figure 2.2: Total Number of SDCs in SWIFT vs SWIFT-R in Fault Injection Ex-
periments Performed on Register File
many single-point-of-failures. In fact, in case of SWIFT-R these should be bigger
because it imposes more register pressure than SWIFT, resulting in more spilling
code (memory operations). Apart from this SWIFT-R replaces compare operations
used by SWIFT’s error detection routines with majority voting before every memory
operation, thereby adding vulnerability to the already vulnerable parts of SWIFT pro-
grams. In-order to quantify the vulnerability added by SWIFT-R on top of SWIFT I
performed 90,000 fault injection experiments on Register File while running 10 bench-
marks from MIbench on a gem5 simulator based ARM processor(10,000 faults on each
benchmark). As in shown in Figure 2.2, it was observed that adding SWIFT-R upon
a given SWIFT program considerably increased number of SDCs in all the 10 bench-
marks.
Recovery can also be implemented by means of checkpointing and rollback. Since
the program replays certain number of instructions after resuming from most recent
checkpoint, this mode of recovery is often referred to as Backward Recovery. Check-
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pointing can be done either at application level (coarse-grained) (or) at instruction
level (fine-grained).
Coarse-grained/offline check-pointing approaches Hargrove and Duell (2006); Sankaran
et al. (2005) pause the execution of a program, save the memory and program states
and then resume execution. So they need more storage for saving the state.
In this work InCheck, a fine-grained recovery approach that integrates check-pointing
into the program at instruction level to accomplish fast and efficient error recovery
is presented. InCheck implements recovery on top of a given fine-grained detection
scheme without compromising the detection’s fault coverage.
Recent works like Xu et al. (2013); Kadav et al. (2013) demonstrated the use of
fine-grained checkpointing for error recovery. FASER Xu et al. (2013), is a fine-
grain backward recovery approach implemented on top of SWIFT. The process of
checkpointing in FASER is flawed. Check-pointing is performed only on store-free
basic blocks. Therefore, if a store operation makes an erroneous change to mem-
ory, it cannot be undone as it does not make memory checkpoints. As a result, the
recovery operation performed by restoring the values of registers from the previous
checkpoint, can use the erroneous memory location after recovery and could lead to
an SDC. SWIFT detection mechanism cannot detect such errors because it does not
duplicate memory instructions. There are similar flaws in many other existing fine-
grained backward recovery approaches. However, through InCheck I could perform a
flawless recovery from almost every error caught by the detection mechanism.
The fault coverage offered by a fine-grained backward recovery approach highly de-
pends on the detection mechanism they are built upon. These techniques cannot
recover from errors undetected by their underlying detection scheme. Even if the re-
covery methodology is flawless, the coverage numbers could still be the same or even
worse if the recovery is integrated into an improper detection scheme. Therefore,
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prime importance was given to two factors while designing InCheck.
1. Choosing a detection technique that has very good coverage.
2. Implementing the recovery scheme without losing the coverage offered by de-
tection technique.
Amongst all the recent literature on Fine-grained soft-error detection techniques we
considered to implement InCheck, nZDC Didehban and Shrivastava (2016), could
provide a near-zero SDC with an acceptable performance overhead. So it has been
chosen as a candidate for implementing InCheck on top of it.
2.1 nZDC: A Detection Technique for near Zero SDC
nZDC is a fine-grain error detection technique which duplicates all computa-
tional,logical, memory read and compare instructions in a program and checks the
results of memory write and conditional branch instructions after their execution.
Figure 2.1 illustrates key ideas of nZDC data-flow error-detection. As it shows, the
nZDC technique, loads-back the stored value (x1) from the memory and compares
that against the redundantly-computed value(x1*). Therefore, nZDC is not only able
to detect the effect of soft error on the operands of memory write instructions, but
also errors which impact the execution of memory write instructions themselves.
nZDC introduced a new control-flow scheme which is able to detect wrong-direction
and wrong-address control flow errors. Wrong-direction control flow errors are those
errors which can directly or indirectly cause a branch direction to alter from taken
to not-taken or vise-versa. For instance, if error happens during the computation of
operand(s) of a compare instruction, it can change the result of compare instruction
and, indirectly alter the direction of conditional branch instruction. In another in-
stance, the error can directly affect the op-code of a conditional branch instruction,
8
// body of BB
// body of BB
// body of BB
cmp x1, x2
b.cond .BB1
// body of BB
// body of BB
// body of BB
cmp CDR  x1, x2
if (cond) CDR= !CDR
if ( CCR != 0) Error
cmp CCR  x1*, x2*
b.cond .BB1
If (!cond) CDR= !CDR
XNOR   CCR, CCR, CDR
XNOR   CCR, CCR, CDR
XNOR   CCR, CCR, CDR
if ( CCR != 0) Error
if ( CCR != 0) Error
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: nZDC Wrong-Direction CF Error Detection
and result in a wrong-direction control flow error. Figure 2.3 demonstrates wrong-
direction control flow detection part of nZDC control-flow checking technique. nZDC
CF scheme also employees static signatures to detect wrong address control flow er-
rors in which an unexpected jump will change the control flow of a program. The
reasons of wrong address branches can be a fault on PC (Program Counter), errors
which change the op-code of a non-branch instruction to a branch instruction, or
the errors during the computation of target address of a taken-branch instruction.
However, as study Shrivastava et al. (2014) shows that wrong direction control flow
errors are dominant control flow errors and wrong target control flow errors are rare.
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Chapter 3
INCHECK: THE INTEGRATED RECOVERY METHODOLOGY
The goal of my thesis work is to provide an Integrated recovery scheme for nZDC-
protected codes, without losing the coverage offered by nZDC. However, the main
challenge in recovery from nZDC detected errors is its late error detection. nZDC
detects errors by checking the results of store (after performing store instruction) or
detects the control flow errors once the program is in the wrong basic block. Therefore,
in each case, the recovery scheme should be able to return the state of the program
(registers, memory, PC) to an error-free state by eliminating the possible side effects
of error.
3.1 Recovery from Data Flow Errors
InCheck’s strategy for recovery from errors that nZDC detects after a memory
write instruction is presented in this section.
3.1.1 Safe Two-Phase Register-File Checkpointing
The main idea behind the InCheck is to make frequent built-in checkpoints at BB
(Basic Block) granularity by preserving the live error-free registers in a specific part
of memory (check-pointing storage) and restore them in the case of error detection.
However, it is very crucial that the saved registers should be error-free. Therefore, the
register preservation process requires some extra checking instructions (on the top of
nZDC error checks) to make sure that the error-free registers are saved to the check-
pointing storage. For that purpose, inCheck strategy reserves some spaces in memory
which is as big as nZDC master registers (if the nZDC master instructions are using 15
10
BB:
load R1 <- [R2]
load R1* <- [R2*]
R1++
R1*++
store R1 -> [R2]
load R1 <- [R2*]
cmp R1, R1*
b.ne recovery
register recovery:
restore(R2)
branch to BB
BB:
load R1 <- [R2]
load R1* <- [R2*]
R1++
R1*++
preserve([R2])->M_REG
store R1 -> [R2]
load R1 <- [R2*]
cmp R1, R1*
b.ne recovery memory recovery:
M_REG -> restore([R2])
register recovery:
restore(R2)
branch to BB
Original program First-cut recovery scheme (with register restoration only) InCheck recovery (with memory and register restoration)
preserve(R2) preserve(R2)
10 10 11 10 10 16[R2]
j k l
16 16
n
17
In recovery block, R2 is loaded 
with correct initial address but 
[R2] remains un-restored
j k l
load R1 <- [R2]
R1++
store R1 -> [R2]
10 10 16[R2]
j k
10 10
m n
11
In recovery block, [R2] is re-loaded 
with its initial value before store 
operation
[R2]
recovery: recovery:
j
k
l
m
n
Soft-error 
happens 
on R1 
Soft-error 
happens 
on R1 
j k j m
Q P
Labels
checkpointing: checkpointing:
Part (a) Part (b) Part (c)
Figure 3.1: InCheck Recovery Strategy from Data-Flow Errors
64-bit wide programmer available registers, then checkpointing-storage size in memory
should be 2 x 15 x 8 = 240 Bytes). InCheck partitions checkpointing-storage into two
halves, and, periodically uses one segment to save the live registers of every alternate
basic-block. The reason is that if the manifestation of error in a register pair gets
detected, after the process of making a new checkpoint, the program can use the last
safe checkpoint (which is preserved in the other segment of checkpointing-storage) to
restore the register value and repeat the computation.
3.1.2 Need for Memory Checkpointing
Unfortunately, because of the late error detection strategy of nZDC, register file
checkpointing alone cannot guarantee a successful recovery. For instance, consider the
code snippet shown in figure 3.1. Part(a) of figure shows the original code, in which a
variable reads some data from the memory, increments its value and saves it back to
the same location of the memory. Part-(b) shows the first-cut solution for recovery. As
it shows, the value of R2 register was saved to check-pointing storage in the beginning
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of BB and the body of BB is protected by nZDC error detection scheme. Now
consider an error that alters the value of R1 register. The store instruction then saves
the faulty-value of R1 into the correct memory location. However, nZDC checks after
memory write instruction discover a mismatch between the stored value (faulty-R1)
and the redundantly-computed value( R1*) and declare the manifestation of this error.
The first-cut recovery technique loads the safely saved value of R2 from check-pointing
storage and transfers control flow of the program to first instruction in BB. However,
the program loads the faulty value (faulty-R1) from the memory and increments it
twice. Finally, program saves the [R1-faulty++] to the memory and since this value
now matches with the redundant-computed ones, the program execution proceeds
with wrong data.
3.1.3 InCheck Memory Preservation and Restoration
To solve the problem of memory checkpointing in an effective way, I first transform
the nZDC-protected BB to safe-recovery basic blocks in which at most one memory
instruction is allowed. Then, InCheck preserves a backup of memory location that is
about to get overwritten by the store instruction by inserting a load instruction right
before the program store instructions. It then saves the loaded value in a specially
reserved register, called MemReg. Now, assume that the value of x1 has changed to
faulty-x1 because of an error. The backup-load preserves the state of memory before
store instruction, and InCheck Recovery routine first restores the memory state to
last fault-free state by writing the memory-backed-up data, preserved in MemReg, to
memory. Then, it restores the registers from check-pointing storage and transfers the
control-flow of program to first non-checkpointing instruction of the basic block. Now
the program can resume its execution without any erroneous data.
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3.2 Recovery from Control-Flow Errors
Soft errors can change the control flow of a program in two ways,
• Wrong target
• Wrong direction
A wrong target control flow arises when, for instance, an error alters the target address
of a taken branch instruction (if the branch is not-taken the error would get masked)
or the error changes opcode of a non-branch instruction to a branch instruction, or
even errors directly altering the value of program counter register. A wrong target
control flow error gets detected with signature-part of nZDC control flow checking
mechanism. A wrong direction control flow, on the other hand, occurs when a branch
direction changes from taken to not-taken or vice-versa, which can be caused by
errors affecting (directly or in-directly) cmp instructions (operands as well as opcode)
or branch instruction’s opcode or even program status flag register. Since the wrong
direction control flow errors are considerably more frequent than wrong target errors
Shrivastava et al. (2014), in this work, we provide the recovery from such errors, and,
leave wrong target control flow errors as detected/unRecoverable.
The main challenge in recovery from control flow errors is that by the time
nZDC detects the presence of a control-flow error, the register state saved in storage-
checkpoint for the recovery purpose may not be the correct one due to several reg-
ister preservation operations. For instance, consider an nZDC-protected basic block
(nZDC-BB) which is a fan-in basic block (has more than one predecessors) and con-
tains at least one memory write instruction and control-flow error-check is positioned
close to the end of the basic block by nZDC technique. Since there is a store in the
middle of basic block, InCheck transformation converts the nZDC-BB in two consec-
utive basic-blocks (InCheckBB1 and IncheckBB2), which are separated immediately
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after memory write instructions. Assume that at run time the control flow of the pro-
gram reaches to InCheckBB1 from the predecessor1 in which InCheck preserves the
live registers of predecessor1 into the first segment of checkpointing-storage. Once the
control-flow of program reaches to InCheckBB1, the register-file preservation takes
place first and the live registers get saved into the second segment of checkpointing-
storage and no error is detected because the nZDC control-flow error detector is
placed at the end of InCheckBB2 basic block. Once the program control reaches to
the InCheckBB2, InCheck checkpointing mechanism saves the live registers into first
segment of checkpointing-storage (the register backup for the predecessor1 is gone).
Finally, in the end of InCheckBB2, nZDC error detector discovers a control-flow error.
However, the recovery is not possible because the back-up data for the predecessor1
block is already overwritten. To solve this problem, InCheck also adds an extra
control-flow detection check after the register-file preservation at the beginning of all
fan-in basic blocks. The idea of InCheck error recovery has been shown in Figure 3.2.
Check pointing:
main thread
shadow thread
recovery:
BB 2:
Check pointing:
main thread shadow thread
BB 1:
cond. branch     BB 2
Redundant computation
Redundant computation
Check pointing:
main thread shadow thread
BB 3:
cond. branch     BB 2
Redundant computation
step-1:Restore Registers & 
memory
step-2: Jump back to label 
address stored in label_reg
nZDC Control Flow Error 
Detection:
CF error detected? -> exit( )
1. Register File Preservation
2. Checkpoint Error Detection
3. Control Flow Error Detection
if error detected?
1. Register File Preservation
2. Checkpoint Error Detection
3. Save label addr. of current 
BB
1. Register File Preservation
2. Checkpoint Error Detection
3. Save label addr. of current 
BB
main thread shadow thread
BB 3:
cond. branch     BB 2
Redundant computation
main thread shadow thread
BB 1:
cond. branch     BB 2
Redundant computation
main thread
shadow thread
BB 2:
Redundant computation
nZDC Control Flow Error 
Detection:
CF error detected? -> exit( )
nZDC nZDC + InCheck
Figure 3.2: InCheck Recovery Strategy from Control-Flow Errors
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3.2.1 Unrecoverable Errors
InCheck’s recovery mechanism has been developed to always perform correct re-
covery. The diagnosis mechanism built into the recovery modules is responsible to
decide whether a fault is recoverable or unrecoverable. If the diagnosis routine de-
clares a fault as unrecoverable, InCheck stops the process of recovery and by deeming
the fault as detected. This strategy of InCheck avoids the possibility if SDCs that
can happen due to improper recovery.
The necessity to declare a fault as detected/unrecoverable comes when the store in-
struction corrupts a data element in memory that was not backed up by the load
that performed memory preservation. Figure 3.3 depicts a code snippet from an
nZDC+InCheck basic block. When a fault happens on register x2 after the first load
instruction and before the execution of store, there are chances that store instruction
is going to corrupt a memory location that we did not backup into M_REG. In order
to prevent that from happening, we tried to be conservative in designing InCheck’s
recovery process. Any error that changed the memory that we haven’t backed up is
deemed as Detected/Un-Recoverable error.
load M_REG  [x2]
store  x1 [x2]
load   x1 [x2*]
compare (x1 , x1*) 
if(x1≠x1*)  recovery 
Figure 3.3: Unrecoverable Faults
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.1 Compilation and Simulation Framework
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of nZDC+inCHECK fault tolerant technique,
I implemented SWIFTR and nZDC+inCHECK techniques as late back-end passes in
LLVM 3.7 infrastructure for an ARMv8-a ISA. This implementation enabled me to
take advantage of all the advanced compiler optimizations. I compiled 6 benchmarks
from Mibench benchmark suite Guthaus et al. (2001) with -O3 compiler optimization
flag. For each benchmark three versions, Original , nZDC+inCheck, SWIFT-R were
generated. It should be noted I did not modify the standard library functions and
therefore am excluding them from all of fault injection and performance overhead
estimation results shown in this work. Extensive fault injection experiments were
performed on different hardware components of a modern, high-performance low-
power, ARM cortex A-53 like microprocessor simulated in gem5Binkert et al. (2011)
a cycle accurate simulator. Table 4.1 shows the details of the processor configuration.
4.2 Fault Model and Injection Set-Up
Fault model and Fault sites:
I used single bit-flip per execution as the fault model in this work. Faults were in-
jected on different bits of various hardware components including general purpose
integer register file, pipeline decoder and instruction queue registers, integer func-
tional units and load-store unit buffers. Processor-wide fault injection enables us to
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Parameter Value
CPU Model ARM64 bit in-order processor
Pipeline Two way/4-stage
NUmber of FUs 2Int, 1Mul, 1Div, 1Float, 1Mem
L1 D/I-Cache 64KB (2-way) / 32KB (2-way)
TLB size 512 entries
Integer registerfile 32 registers (64-bit width)
Store buffer size 5 entries
Table 4.1: Simulator Parameters.
estimate the microprocessor-level recovery capability of InCheck. In fact as Cho et al.
(2013) pointed out and our experimental results also confirm, injecting single bit-flip
just in register file is not a true representative for the whole system, because it can
not capture all effects of errors.
Number of fault injections experiments and outcome classification: To make
sure that I covered almost all cases in my experimental results we randomly inject
400 faults for each version of a program. Thus, we injected 1600 faults in four hard-
ware components per version of program. Overall, we performed 9600 fault injection
experiments. According to Leveugle et al. (2009), these extensive fault injection ex-
periments provide us a 1% error margin with 95% confidence interval in our results.
It is worth to mention that similar researchers Didehban and Shrivastava (2016);
Mitropoulou et al. (2014); Feng et al. (2010); Reis et al. (2007); Khudia et al. (2012)
usually assume 95% confidence interval with 1% error which is achievable by just in-
jecting about 400 fault injection experiments per component. For each fault injection
experiment, a target component and a (bit, cycle) are randomly selected before the
simulation run starts. Once the simulator reaches the target fault injection cycle,
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simulation is paused, the selected bit is inverted, and then, the simulation run re-
sumes its execution till simulation terminates or the allowable simulation time gets
completed. The result of each simulation run is classified into one of the following
category:
Masked: Program terminates and the output is correct.
Failed: Program terminates normally, but, the output is incorrect.
Detected/Recovered: Since the goal of this work is to prevent a program from
producing any incorrect output and provide the recovery from the detected faults, we
also count the number of Detected/Recovered faults.
Others: Program terminates by generating some symptoms such as segmentation
fault or simulation time is over.
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Chapter 5
EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
5.1 Fault Injection Results
Figure 5.1 depicts the absolute number of injected faults which lead to SDCs in dif-
ferent hardware components. Fault injection during the execution of nZDC+InCheck-
protected programs never resulted in an SDC. This implies that,
1. Error detection is able to detect all errors
2. Diagnosis routine distinguished all recoverable errors from unrecoverable errors,
3. If it was recoverable error, the recovery routine succeeded every single time.
The nZDC+inCHECK error detection is able to detect all errors because it takes
place after the execution of critical instructions rather than before, and it checks
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Figure 5.2: Total Number of SDCs from Processor-Wide Single Bit-Flip Fault In-
jection Experiments
for silent-store and missing-memory update vulnerable cases. However, SWIFTR
transformation can reduce the percentage of SDCs from 16.4%, 8.8%, 9.1% and 3.8%
to 8.7%, 4.1%, 1.7% and 1.4% for register file, pipeline registers, functional units and
load-store unit, respectively. Surprisingly, for some programs such as qsort SWIFTR
transformation actually doubles the number of failures! For a SWIFT-R protected
program, the SDCs in Register file mainly occur when error happens between the time
elapsed from voter providing its final output to the critical instruction reading it. In
case of qsort, voter single-point-of-failures before frequent library calls are the reason
for growth in SDC count. The main reason of SDCs from fault injection on pipeline
register and functional units in SWIFTR-protected programs is that the injected
fault affects the computation of an unprotected instruction, i,e. memory or compare
operations. Figure 5.2 refers to the total number of SDCs that occurred during the
Processor level Fault Injection campaign that was performed on Original, SWIFT-
20
R and nZDC+InCheck protected versions of the programs in MiBench Benchmark.
SWIFT-R could bring down the total number of SDCs in Original program from 982
to 299. However InCheck could bring this number down to zero!
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5.2 Detected and Unrecoverable Errors
As specified in 5.3, InCheck was unable to recover from about 5% of the faults
detected by SDC. However, nZDC+InCheck caught all those unrecoverable faults
and deemed them as detected. Restart/Retry can be employed as recovery in these
scenarios.
Out of all the fault injection experiments performed on 4 major hardware components
of the processor, InCheck showed 5 detected/unrecoverable faults in Register File, 61
in Load Store Queue, 2 in Pipeline Registers and 4 in Functional Unit Registers.
Overall, InCheck had a successful recovery rate of about 96% throughout the Fault
Injection Campaign.
94.82
5.18
1
10
100
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 F
au
lt
s 
(%
)
Recovered Detected/UnRecoverable
Figure 5.3: Percentage Recoverable vs Detected/Unrecoverable Faults with InCheck
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5.3 Performance Overhead
Figure 5.4 shows the execution overheads of InCheck+nZDC and SWIFT-R pro-
tected programs normalized to Original Program. It can be see that on an average,
an nZDC+InCheck version of a program can run 105% faster than its SWIFT-R
equivalent. The performance overhead reported in this work may seem higher than
similar works because of two main reasons.
1. Unlike common practice in related works Feng et al. (2010), numbers reported
in this work are based on the cycles that a program spends in the user function
where the protection scheme was applied. I excluded the cycles for executing
unmodified library calls.
2. Similar works usually select an aggressively OoO processor which in protected
version of the program can best utilize the hardware.
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Figure 5.4: Execution Overhead of InCheck Normalized to nZDC
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In Figure 5.5, the breakdown of dynamic instructions committed by InCheck and
nZDC fractions of the executed program is presented. It shows that, on an average
nZDC+InCheck program has about 20% more dynamic instructions compared to its
nZDC counterpart.
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Figure 5.5: Dynamic Instruction Count of nZDC and InCheck
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Chapter 6
LIMITATIONS OF INCHECK
Though not encountered in our extensive FI experiments, there is a very rare possi-
bility that InCheck’s recovery could cause SDC. If error happens on InCheck’s Store
instruction (register file preservation) and changes the effective address of such in-
structions in a way that it overwrites useful data of a critical memory location being
used by the program, it could cause an SDC. That being said, it can be avoided by
adding load back and compare instructions inside checkpointing routine before every
register preservation. Considering the fact that it hasn’t happened in my experiments,
I saved on execution time by making this trade-off.
In benchmarks with very large number of stores, the checkpointing overhead might
be considerably high. This will result in large execution overheads. However, other
recovery approaches also suffer from similar problems when the program has large
number of store instructions.
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
A backward recovery methodology called InCheck has been proposed in this work.
It has been integrated with nZDC, a fine-grain duplication based SE detection tech-
nique. It could recover from almost all faults detected by nZDC. The fault injection
results proved that the nZDC+InCheck protected programs could accomplish high
recovery rates without compromising the fault coverage given by nZDC.
Since all our experiments were performed on a gem5 based processor simulator, there
are chances that some of the processor’s architectural bits might have not been mod-
eled accurately inside it. So we are planning to perform RTL level fault injection
experiments to test the soft-error resilience of InCheck.
The process of verification is never complete. There will always be certain corner
cases that the random fault injection campaigns may not have covered. That being
said, it is also impractical to go for a comprehensive (exhaustive) fault injection as-
sessment. Therefore to understand any possible flaws in my approach that were not
evident from my fault injection experiments, I am planning to consider doing a formal
analysis of InCheck for a simple processor architectural model.
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